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Abstract
We present a framework for the analysis of tax and benefit policy in countries with
significant informality. Our framework allows us to jointly analyse the e ects of various
taxes and benefits on incentives for firms and workers to be informal and evade taxation.
We find that payroll taxes and targeted minimum income guarantees targeted to households
without formal employment are particularly harmful to labour formality and participation
in the modern sector labour force. Conversely, Bismarkian benefits targeted to formal
sector workers and basic benefits targeted to low income households represent the least
distortionary way to redistribute. Attempts to use holes in the VAT to “protect” the
poor are generally ine ective and open up avenues for rent seeking. We also find that
a uniform value added tax and a corporate income tax represent the least distortionary
way to raise revenues. The information generated from a simple VAT can be used, given
an appropriately designed tax administration, to enhance the probability of detection of
informal activities. Distributional issues are best handled by social policy measures and the
personal income tax. Indeed, given the gainers and losers from tax reforms, social policies
and intergovernmental transfers will be needed to ensure the political acceptance of the
reforms. The precise mix of taxation and social policy will vary given di erent country
characteristics and institutional structures.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a general framework for the analysis of public policy making in situations of
informality. This is particularly important in developing countries as diverse as Mexico and Pak-
istan, where both the social policy design, as well as financing, represent “good intentions, but
bad outcomes,” using the insightful terminology of Santiago Levy (2008). However, the insights
carry over also to EU countries in crisis, such as Greece, where informality and unemployment
pose significant barriers to the sustainability of Bismarkian social protection mechanisms and
constrain the e ective operation of the main standard tax tools–including the corporate and
income taxes, payroll contributions and the value added tax (VAT).
Our framework allows us to examine how various forms of taxation a ect incentives for
informality of workers and firms and how these feed into the overall labour productivity, e -
ciency and output of the economy. We build on existing work on Mexico by Levy and coauthors
(Levy, 2008; Antón et al., 2011), finding, as they do, that payroll taxes give rise to particularly
unfavourable incentives for formality. What is more, we find that payroll taxes also depress
incentives for participation in the modern sector labour force and that they reduce labour pro-
ductivity and output. We also find that corporate income taxes reduce incentives for employing
workers informally and hence increase productivity, as formal workers, but not informal workers,
are expensable in determining a firm’s corporate income tax (CIT) base. We also find that a
uniform VAT preserves production e ciency, though it provides incentives to under-report sales.
Incentives to under report sales depend on both the corporate income tax rate and the VAT
rate and on their interaction, suggesting that raising revenue through a combination of the two
instruments may be more e ective than relying excessively on either one.
Indeed, the main advantage of a properly designed VAT is to generate information that
could be used to tighten administration, and with positive results for the VAT and also income
tax revenues. A VAT with exemptions and holes for the poor generally does little for the
poor, becomes a source of rent seeking and loses revenues. Concern for the poor would then
appropriately depend on social policy design, and the personal income tax would address income
distributional issues. The balance across taxes would depend on country circumstances, and
revenue needs–it is unlikely that raising the VAT indefinitely (e.g., to 27% as recently in Greece)
would be a sensible approach in the presence of informality. The changing e ects of tax reforms
on resources at the disposal of governments at di erent levels, would require a joint assessment
and modifications in intergovernmental transfers to ensure that states/provinces do not lose
from the reforms. The issue of assignments of the major taxes to subnational governments
could include simple “piggy-backed options” rather than the complex splitting of the base that
is seen in the Indian sub-continent–these issues are not addressed in this paper.
On the social policy side we find that benefits that only formal workers are eligible for
provide strong incentives for workers to be formal and also have positive e ects on participation
in the modern sector labour force, labour productivity and output. This makes some formal
sector benefits an attractive instrument for redistribution purposes since formal workers’ wages
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are known and thus it will be feasible to e ectively target lower income “formal” households.
Conversely, targeting households without formal employment could have the e ect of increasing
informality if the level of the benefit is too high. If workers are able to simultaneously receive
the benefit and take informal employment, but would lose the benefit if they become formal
workers, then such a benefit would increase the attractiveness of being in the informal sector.
Furthermore, such benefits could also discourage participation in the modern sector labour force
and depress productivity and output.
This suggests that targeting benefits according to the employment status (formal or informal)
of workers should be done cautiously. Notwithstanding this, benefits targeted to households with
low income levels (independently of their employment status) can provide an attractive vehicle
for redistribution, provided due care is taken in their design to take into account the incentives
they present to low income households. Many countries could expand existing programmes for
the poor (whether formal or informal) to compensate for adverse relative price changes, e.g.,
coming about from eliminations of zero-ratings and exemptions in the VAT.
The public finance literature on informality in developing countries has largely focused on
how they should balance consumption taxes (usually the VAT) and trade taxes. Appropriately,
the main issues here have been the ability of such taxes to reach the informal sector and the
ability of governments to administer and enforce taxes, such as the VAT (see, for example Keen
& Mintz, 2004; Emran & Stiglitz, 2005; Keen, 2008 and Boadway & Sato, 2009). This litera-
ture usually takes an optimal commodity taxation approach, building on the classical Ramsey
framework and Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976) (an important exception that is relevant to our work
is Dharmapala et al., 2011). However, we think it is important to include income taxation
and labour informality in the design of a desirable mix of instruments,given significant revenue
requirements in the developing country context. Indeed we show that there are important in-
teractions between the CIT and the VAT in the presence of informality that existing work has
not highlighted.
The literature on informality relating to firms has tended to focus on registration decisions
of the firms, and particularly on small scale microentrepreneurs (see, for example, La Porta &
Shleifer, 2008; de Mel et al., 2010 and McKenzie & Sakho, 2010). There is also a literature in
developing countries focusing on how connected or not the formal and informal labour markets
are (see, for example Bosch & Maloney, 2010 and Günther & Launov, 2012). In the literature,
the closest to our approach is work that combines firms and workers in modeling the incentives
for informality such as Levy (2008) and de Paula & Scheinkman (2010), which we build on.
In sections (2) and (3) we present our framework, focusing first on workers and then on
firms. Section (4) uses the framework to analyse the e ect of changing the rates at which
taxes are levied, the levels of benefits, the e ectiveness with which benefits are targeted and the
e ectiveness of detection of tax evasion. Finally, section (5) discusses extensions for future work
and section (6) concludes.
3
2 Workers
Societies are populated by households with diverse earnings potentials. To capture this feature
in the simplest possible way, we will assume that there are two types of workers, with high and
low ability, and that high ability workers are relatively scarce. Specifically, there is a mass 1 of
high ability workers, and a mass N > 1 of low ability workers. Individuals also di er in their
employment status. Some individuals operate entirely outside the modern sector. This may
be because they are unemployed, or because they work in agricultural occupations, or are self
employed in a manner that they are not included in the tax net. Either way, these workers are
not registered to pay payroll (or income) taxes; and if they work, they are in occupations that
are also outside the tax net. Furthermore, as they are unregistered workers, they do not receive
benefits available only to formal workers.
Individuals who work in the modern sector may or may not be registered with the authorities.
We refer to unregistered workers as informal workers. It is important to note that, following
most of the literature on informality (see, for example, Levy, 2008; Kanbur, 2009) we do not
equate informality with illegality. Informal workers may be illegal workers, but they may also
be workers working on commission or be self employed, and as such may not be illegal. Formal
workers receive a salary from an employer, are fully registered with the tax and social security
authorities and are, hence, likely compliant with labour and tax laws.
Empirically, higher skilled and older individuals are less likely to be informal workers (see,
for example, Perry et al., 2007; Bosch & Maloney, 2010) and so for simplicity we will assume
that all high skilled individuals are formal workers. The low ability individuals may be outside
the modern sector, informal workers, or formal workers. This assumption is made only to keep
the model tractable. It can be relaxed without losing any of the qualitative results here, but
would add significantly to the complexity of the equations.
Note that we assume that workers are either completely informal or completely formal. That
is, informal workers are not registered either for tax or for benefit purposes. In most countries
this is not problematic as it would be di cult to lie to one authority and not to others, however,
in many countries where the administrations of taxes and benefits are substantially separated,
it may be possible, for example, for a worker not to pay payroll (or income) taxes, but to receive
benefits that only registered workers are eligible for.
All high ability workers are equally productive, and they all receive a wage wH . We will also
assume that the high skilled labour market is competitive, so that both firms and workers take
the wage as given. Low ability workers’ wages will depend on their legal status as well as their
skill level (as is discussed in more detail in section 3 below), with informal workers receiving wI
and formal workers receiving wF .
All households are eligible to receive a universal benefit at a level bU . This benefit is pro-
vided to all households, regardless of skill level/income or formal status. For example, Bolivia’s
universal pension (Renta Dignidad) can be thought of in this way. Second, formal sector workers
(all high skilled workers and low skilled workers in the formal sector) are eligible to receive a
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formal sector benefit bF . An example of this kind of benefit is the provision of healthcare and
insurance through Social Security (IMSS) in Mexico.
Third, there is a targeted transfer intended for low income households, bL. However, the
targeting of the program (through, for example, means testing) is imperfect and the government’s
screening technology only accurately identifies the low-skilled households with probability “.
This means that low ability households expect to receive “bL while high income households will
expect to receive (1≠ “) bL. Imperfections in targeting may be technological in the sense that
they stem from the di culty of observing the eligibility status of a household, or they may stem
from rent-seeking by the implementing o cials who extract bribes from ineligible households in
order to receive the benefit. In addition, if implementation is by lower levels of government than
that responsible for the financing of the benefit (usually the center), there could be a possibility
of generating agency problems.
Finally, there is a targeted minimum income guarantee (TMIG) targeted at low ability house-
holds who are not working in the formal sector (note that workers may simultaneously receive
this benefit and work informally, though not all will) set at a level bO. In many countries,
a natural example of such a benefit is unemployment insurance, which is tied to an individ-
ual’s formal employment sector. Indeed, here there is a wealth of evidence that individuals
sometimes simultaneously receive benefits and work informally, and also that the level of such
benefits a ects the intensity with which individuals seek employment. In developing countries,
an example of such a benefit is India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA),
a workfare scheme giving publicly funded work guarantees to workers in rural areas, at least to
the extent that it is possible for households to receive the NREGA work and simultaneously
work informally as, say agricultural labourers. This would no longer be possible if the workers
were to take formal work.
While high ability workers are all formal, we have not yet discussed the allocation of low
ability workers to the formal and informal sectors. Our setup is not one that is equipped to
explicitly deal with involuntary unemployment, so the allocation of low skilled individuals to
their three possible occupations happens through the interplay of the willingness of the low
ability households to work in the three sectors, the willingness of firms to hire formal and
informal workers, and the incentives for these choices presented by the tax and benefit system.
That said, the distinction between self-employment in the informal sector and unemployment
is not particularly sharp and may not be policy relevant here (Rauch, 1991). While some
informality is doubtless the result of the rationing of jobs in the formal sector, much recent work
has shown that most informality is voluntary in the sense that it responds to incentives and
therefore that one should focus on these incentives when analysing the allocation of households
to these three sectors (Maloney, 2004; La Porta & Shleifer, 2008; Bosch & Maloney, 2010).
Low ability households vary in two respects. First, low ability households vary in the oppor-
tunity cost of working in a firm, either formally or informally. This opportunity cost may be the
foregone earnings from subsistence agriculture or small-scale self employed activities, or it may
be a fixed cost of going to work in the modern sector (for example, in cases where we think of bO
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Ability Level
Low Ability High Ability
Formal wF + bU + bF +  bL + µi wH + bU + bF + (1   )bL
Informal wI + bU + bO +  bL N/A
Outside "i + bU + bO N/A
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Table 1: Consumption Levels of Three Sorts of Households
as an unemployment benefit), or finally it could be the disutility from taking formal or informal
work in the private sector, or something like a caste based barrier to gaining employment in the
(in)formal sector as, for example might be the case for government employment schemes like
NREGA in India. We denote the value of this outside option as Ái which is assumed to be dis-
tributed among the population according to the well-behaved cumulative distribution function
K (Á).
Second, low ability households are assumed to have an idiosyncratic attachment to work in
the formal sector, conditional upon working in the modern sector that influences their willingness
to work informally. This idiosyncratic component may stem from variations in how households
value the benefits available to them in the formal sector (see, for example Levy, 2008, chapter
3), or the peace of mind from knowing that the household is behaving in accordance with the
law etc. This attachment to the formal sector is denoted by µi, which is distributed among the
population according to the well-behaved cumulative distribution function J (µ) independently
of Ái. Individuals’ expected utility levels will, therefore, be as summarised in Table 1.
In order to establish how low ability workers choose between the three options open to them,
we think of their occupational choice as a two stage problem. First, households choose whether
to seek (in)formal employment or to stay out of the private sector labour force. Then, if the
worker chooses to seek (in)formal employment, she chooses whether to seek formal or informal
work. For simplicity, we will assume that households do not know their attachment to the formal
sector µi when choosing whether or not to seek (in)formal employment, but rather have beliefs
regarding their µi distributed (correctly) according to J (µ). Imagine, for example, that working
in the modern sector requires traveling to the city to seek work. In this case, households may
first decide whether to travel to the city and then once in the city, decide what sort of work to
seek.
Solving backward, let us start in the second stage with the decision of whether to work
formally or informally. An individual with a given level of µi receives utility of UFL = CFL+µi,
where CFL = wF + bU + bF +“bL if they work as a formal worker, while their utility from being
informal is simply their consumption UIL = CIL = wI + bU + bO + “bL. Workers will choose to
work in the formal sector if UFL > UIL. That is, they will choose to seek formal work if their
attachment to the formal sector exceeds a critical value µ˜.
µi > wI ≠ wF + bO ≠ bF = µ˜
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This critical value of the attachment to the formal sector is determined by the relative wages
that workers in the two sectors receive, but also by the di erence between the benefit that they
can receive as an informal worker, bO, but would lose if they become a formal worker and the
benefit that they will become eligible to receive as a formal worker, bF . As we will see below in
section 4, these benefits will have this direct e ect on informality, but the benefits will also a ect
the equilibrium wage levels wI and wF , so that they also have an indirect e ect on informality
through wages. Overall, of the workers who seek (in)formal work in the modern sector, a fraction
J (µ˜) of them seek informal work, while the remaining 1≠ J (µ˜) seek formal work.
Working back to the decision to enter the modern sector, workers anticipate that if they seek
(in)formal work in the modern sector instead of remaining outside, their expected utility is
E [U ] = J (µ˜)UIL + [1≠ J (µ˜)] (CFL + E [µ|µ > µ˜]) ,
while if they stay out of the modern sector labour force, they will continue to receive the
benefits bO and bU and also receive their reservation value from remaining outside the modern
sector Ái. Comparing these, individuals will choose to enter the private labour force if
Ái < E [U ]≠ bO ≠ bU = Á˜.
As with the decision between formality and informality, there is a critical value of the reservation
value Á˜ and individuals with a small enough reservation value will join the modern sector while
the remainder will stay out of the modern sector. The determinants of this critical value Á˜ are
more complicated than those that determine µ˜ as they include all the determinants of E [U ]
(the wages, wI and wF , the benefits bF , bL and bO, the e ectiveness of targeting “ and the
distribution of µ, J (µ)), but nevertheless, we will show in section 4 how the various policy
instruments a ect participation in the modern sector.
Summarising the total number of individuals in each group, there will be NO = N [1≠K (Á˜)]
households outside the modern sector, NI = NK (Á˜)J (µ˜) informal workers, andNF = NK (Á˜) [1≠ J (µ˜)]
formal workers. In models of endogenous occupational choice and informality the highest abil-
ity individuals become entrepreneurs in the modern sector and intermediate ability individuals
become informal entrepreneurs and they do so in response to the returns to these occupations
(see, for example de Paula & Scheinkman (2010) which builds on Rauch (1991)). We assume
that workers cannot become entrepreneurs in the modern sector and vice versa so that the total
number of workers is fixed and the total number of firms in existence is also fixed. However,
we do allow for the interpretation of being outside the modern sector as being in informal self-
employed activities, so we capture this margin to some extent. This amounts to assuming that
the incentives to become an entrepreneur in the modern sector are not a ected by the tax and
benefit system. This may be the case, for example, if starting a firm requires an operating license
which is only available to those with political connections, or if entry into a sector requires a
large sunk cost and there are credit constraints in the economy.
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3 Firms
There is a rich literature studying the compliance of firms in developing countries with regu-
lations. For instance, de Mel et al. (2010) andMcKenzie & Sakho (2010) study the decision
of firms to register with the authorities finding, respectively, that demand for formality among
microenterprises is low and that mid-sized firms with high ability managers profit from being
formal while small firms do not. Studying informal employment, La Porta & Shleifer (2008) and
Levy (2008) find that many firms simultaneously employ formal and informal workers and that
the propensity to employ formal workers increases with the size of the firm.
Our paper seeks to provide a framework for thinking about the public finance questions of
how to finance social policy when informality and evasion are pervasive. In the spirit of the
recent literature using su cient statistics for welfare analysis (see Chetty, 2009, for a review),
what matters for our purposes is the overall size and composition of the labour force, and the
overall degree of tax compliance of firms. We adopt a very simple treatment of the firm which
allows us to derive su cient statistics for welfare analysis in a straightforward manner. While a
richer treatment of firm responses would add greater colour to our framework, it would also add
a large amount of complexity without, we believe, qualitatively altering the su cient statistics
we derive.
Firms produce output using labour of both skill types. However, formal and informal low-
skilled labour are not equally productive (though they are perfect substitutes) with formal,
low-skilled labour being more productive. The firm’s production function is
Y (LE , H) = L–LE H–H ,
where Y is output, H is the quantity of high skilled labour used, and the input LE = ◊LF +
(1≠ ◊)LI is e ective low-skilled labour, an aggregate of formal (LF ) and informal (LI) low-
skilled labour. This formulation assumes that formal and informal low skilled workers are perfect
substitutes but that 1 > ◊ > 1/2 so that formal, low ability workers are more productive than
informal, low ability workers. We also assume that–H > –L so that high ability workers are
more productive than low ability workers.
Firms face three taxes. First, there is a payroll tax of ·p on the wage bill for formal workers
(of both skill levels). Second, there is a value added tax on the firms’ sales (since in our simple
framework the only input is labour and there are no intermediate goods, the VAT e ectively
approximates a final point sales tax). Finally there is a corporate income tax on profits (here
we assume that the formal wage bill and payroll tax are expensable).
For the purposes of paying taxes, firms must report their sales and the details of their
workforce to the tax authorities. However, enforcement is imperfect and so firms have the
opportunity to misreport their sales and/or their workforce. If they do so, they face some
probability that this under-reporting might be detected, in which case they face a fine for the
tax they have evaded. In the case of their sales, if a firm reports sales of pYˆ and has actual sales
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of pY , the probability of detection is denoted by ⁄Y .
Specifically, we assume that the probability of detection is proportional to the fraction of sales
that is unreported, ⁄Y = min
Ó
÷ Y≠YˆY , 1
Ô
. The parameter ÷ controls the strength of enforcement
of taxes, with larger values of ÷ being associated with better enforcement. In practice, ÷ will be
larger when the tax system generates, collects and uses information e ectively. In particular, the
VAT is the instrument most clearly linked to the magnitude of sales. Generally speaking, taxes
(especially the VAT) with numerous exemptions and complicated rate structures will tend to lend
themselves to weak enforcement both because they generate less useful information and because
they provide numerous opportunities for evasion and corruption. If a firm’s under-reporting is
detected, the firm faces a fine of FY per dollar of unreported sales (the fine here can also represent
the lost profits from legal proceedings, loss of reputation and clients and, even, imprisonment).
Combining these elements, the firm’s expected fine is given by E [FY ] = ⁄Y FY p
1
Y ≠ Yˆ
2
.
Similar, to under-reporting of sales, hiring informal workers amounts to under-reporting the
low-skilled workforce and is also illegal as the payroll contributions would have been evaded.
Firms face another fine if discovered employing informal workers. If a firm has LF formal
unskilled workers and LI informal unskilled workers (for a total of L = LF + LI low skilled
workers), the expected fine is E [FL] = ⁄LFLLI where FL is a fine per informal worker and
⁄L is the probability of detection. Here, we assume that the probability of detection is simply
⁄L = LI/L, the proportion of low ability workers that are informal.
A firm’s expected profits are therefore
  = (1≠ ·c)
Ó
(1≠ ·v) pYˆ ≠ (1 + ·p) [wHH + wFLF ]
Ô
+p
1
Y ≠ Yˆ
2
≠wILI≠E [FL]≠E [FY ] (1)
where ·c is the corporate income tax rate, ·v is the VAT rate (or sales tax, in the one-good
example) and ·p is the payroll tax rate. Firms choose the number workers of the three types
that they hire, LF , LI and H, and the sales that they report Yˆ in order to maximise expected
profits (1). Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below analyse the firm’s decision to (under)report sales and
hire informal labour, which are central to our framework, while the less novel considerations of
the total amount of labour to demand and output to produce, as well as the demonstration that
an equilibrium exists in this framework are relegated to appendix (A).
3.1 Informal sales
The profit maximisation condition for reported sales pYˆ is that
p
I
2÷FY
A
1≠ Yˆ
Y
B
≠ [1≠ (1≠ ·c) (1≠ ·v)]
J
Æ 0 (2)
and rearranging equation (2) we see that the firm’s optimal ratio of reported to total sales is
Yˆ
Y
= 1≠ 12÷FY [1≠ (1≠ ·c) (1≠ ·v)] (3)
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Sales under-reporting is higher the higher is the VAT rate and also higher the higher is the
corporate income tax rate. This is natural as the base of both of these taxes is larger the larger
are reported sales. So as the tax rate rises, so does the incentive to under-report sales. However,
there is also an interesting interaction between the two taxes. The higher is one tax, the more
distortionary are changes in the other tax. How responsive reported sales are to the corporate
income tax rate
1
ˆ
1
Yˆ /Y
2
ˆ·c
2
depends on the VAT rate, and vice versa. That is:
ˆ2 YˆY
ˆ·cˆ·v
= 12÷FY
> 0.
This means that these taxes should be considered in unison and that high levels of either tax
will not only lead to high levels of evasion of that tax, but also increase evasion of the other tax.
This, in turn suggests that high levels of either tax are undesirable and that a combination of
lower, and similar levels of both taxes is preferable.
Equation (3) also says that sales under-reporting is decreasing in ÷, the tax enforcement
parameter, meaning that the probability of detection of sales under-reporting a ects revenues
from both VAT and corporate income taxes. The enforcement parameter reflects not only
the strength of the tax administration’s capacity in the sense of the training of enforcement
o cers and optimal auditing strategies etc., but also the design of tax policy. Complex rate
structures in either the VAT or the CIT with extensive use of exemptions and zero ratings
provide opportunities for evasion and corruption that would be reflected in our framework as a
lower ÷ and hence a lower ratio of reported to total sales.
3.2 Informal Workers
Turning next to the labour market, we first note that the analysis of the labour market of low
skilled workers can be divided into two parts. First, the analysis of the e ective overall demand
and supply of unskilled workers LE and second, the composition of the unskilled workforce in
terms of formal and informal workers. We are most interested in the prevalence of informality
amongst the low skilled workers, so we present the analysis of the second part here and relegate
to the appendix the demonstration of the clearance of the overall market for low-skilled labour.
In particular, we define fD = LDF /L as the relative demand for formal, low-skilled workers,
and — = wF /wI as the relative wage of formal workers. Note that since formal and informal
unskilled labourers are perfect substitutes, in the provision of e ective low skilled labour, firms
will only employ both formal and informal workers if the cost per e ective unit of unskilled
labour (which we will denote by w˜L) is the same for formal as for informal workers. That is, if
the firm employs both formal and informal unskilled workers, it must be the case that1
1
◊
Ë
(1≠ ·c) (1 + ·p)—wI ≠ FL
!
1≠ fD"2È = 11≠ ◊ #wI + FL !1≠ fD" !1 + fD"$ = w˜L.(4)
1This can be seen by combining the first order conditions for profit maximising choices of LI and LF (equations
(7) and (8) in the appendix).
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We are most interested in the prevalence of informality amongst the low skilled labour force so
we define fD = LDF /L as the relative demand for formal, low-skilled workers. See the appendix
for the demonstration that there exists a w˜L that clears the market for e ective low-skilled
labour.
We will analyse the relationship between the formal wage premium — and the rate of formality
f for a given informal wage wI , since for any combination of wF and f , wI is determined by
equation (4) and the level of w˜L that clears the market for e ective low-skilled labour. Applying
the implicit function theorem to (4)
ˆfD
ˆ—
= ≠
1
◊ (1≠ ·c) (1 + ·p)
2F
Ë
1≠f
◊ +
f
1≠◊
È wI < 0.
So, as is intuitive, the demand for formal relative to informal workers is decreasing in the wage
that must be paid to formal workers relative to the informal wage. Just as for the relative
demand for formal labour we can use the equations in section 2 to write the relative supply of
formal labour as
fS = L
S
F
NK (Á˜) = 1≠ J (µ˜) (5)
which is increasing in the formal wage since
ˆfS
ˆ—
= j (µ˜)wI > 0.
This means that if we plot the demand and supply curves in —◊f space, the demand and supply
curves will cross and the unique equilibrium wage satisfies both (5) and (4). This is illustrated
in figure (1). Having set up the framework, we can now use it to study the impact that the
various taxes and benefits have on the size and welfare of the various groups in society. Once we
have specified the role of the government in our model, we can also study how this framework
should inform policy choices by governments, a task we turn to next.
3.3 The Government
For simplicity we ignore the role of government in providing public goods and focus exclusively
on its redistributive and revenue raising role, as has been the case in the classical optimal
income taxation literature (see, for example Mirrlees, 1971; Saez, 2001). The government will
receive revenues from its three tax bases, corporate income, sales, and wages. Total revenues
will therefore be
R = ·c
Ó
pYˆ ≠ (1 + ·p) [wH + wFNF ]
Ô
+ ·vpYˆ + ·p [wH + wFNF ] .
On the expenditure side, the government must finance the benefits it provides: the universal
benefit bU , the targeted transfer bL, the benefit for formal workers bF , and the targeted minimum
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Figure 1: Labour Market for Low-skilled Labour
income guarantee bO. Total expenditures are therefore
E = (1 +N) bU + [1≠ “ + “N ] bL + bF {1 +NF }+ bONO.
We will ignore government debt and assume that the budget must be balanced, so that the
government faces a budget constraint given by
B = E ≠R Æ 0.
Turning to the normative question of how these taxes and benefits a ect welfare, we will
assume that societal welfare W is simply the weighted sum of the welfare of the 5 groups in
society (high skilled workers, 3 classes of low skilled workers and firms).2 Therefore, the overall
welfare in society is given by
W = gILNIUIL + gFLNFUFL + gOLNOUOL + gHUH + g  ,
where the gs are welfare weights on the five groups in society (the 4 classes of households and
firms) and   is the profit of firms. We can also write this in Lagrangean form as
W˜ =W ≠ µB,
2We have deliberately not specified what these weights are. They may be exogenously given weights, or they
may depend on the welfare of each group as in a traditional Atkinson welfare function, which has the property
that the social welfare weights are decreasing in the individual’s income at a rate determined by the society’s
inequality aversion.
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where µ is the marginal cost of public funds (the Lagrange multiplier on the government’s
budget constraint) so that we can take account of how changes in the taxes and benefits a ect
welfare and the government budget. The government has at its disposal 3 taxes (·c, ·p and ·v),
4 benefits (bU , bL, bO and bF ) and there are 2 implementation parameters (“ and ÷). So, we can
di erentiate the welfare function to see the e ects of changing any of these 9 parameters. For
any of these parameters ﬂ œ {·c, ·p, ·v, bU , bL, bO, bF , “, ÷} the change in welfare resulting from
a slight change in the parameter is
ˆW˜
ˆﬂ
= gIL
5
ˆNI
ˆﬂ
UIL +NI
ˆUIL
ˆﬂ
6
+ gFL
5
ˆNF
ˆﬂ
UFL +NF
ˆUFL
ˆﬂ
6
+gOL
5
ˆNO
ˆﬂ
UOL +NO
ˆUOL
ˆﬂ
6
+ gH
ˆUH
ˆﬂ
+ g 
ˆ 
ˆﬂ
≠ µˆB
ˆﬂ
. (6)
What matters is how each parameter a ects the welfare of each group, how it a ects the distri-
bution of low-skilled workers among their three possible occupations as formal workers, informal
workers, or in outside occupations, and how it a ects the government’s budget balance. Equa-
tion (6) specifies what empirical quantities we would want to know in order to estimate the
e ects of policy changes, much as in Ahmad & Stern (1991).
4 E ects of Taxes, Benefits and Implementation
In this section we analyse the impact of changes in the rates of taxes, the levels of benefits and the
implementation parameters “ and ÷ on the prevalence of informal employment, participation in
the modern sector labour force and the wage premium of formal workers. These are interesting
not only in themselves but also in that they would be the key ingredients in an empirical
assessment of the desirability of any such reforms as they are the behavioural elasticities that
represent su cient statistics for welfare analysis in the sense of implementing equation (6) for
the various taxes, benefits and administration e orts.
4.1 Taxes
As has been powerfully argued by Santiago Levy and coauthors (Levy, 2008; Antón et al., 2011),
payroll taxes can create a severe distortion by taxing the formal sector and e ectively subsidising
informality through the benefits available to informal workers that they do not contribute to. In
other cases, minimum wage legislation may also act like a “tax” on formal sector employment,
especially in cases where there is a fragmented labour market and cheaper foreign labour is
available (either formally, through work visas, or through illegal migration). In our framework,
this is also the case and, in fact, the e ects are even worse as there is an additional negative
e ect on participation. As can be seen in figure 2, an increase in the payroll tax shifts the
relative demand curve down and makes it flatter without directly a ecting the relative supply
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Figure 2: Increase in payroll tax
curve. 3 It does this because an increase in the payroll tax makes formal workers more expensive
relative to informal workers (holding wages constant). The overall e ect of this shift is to reduce
formality and the formal sector wage premium as some of this extra cost of employing formal
workers is passed on to the workers in the form of lower wages.
Turning to participation, the e ect depends on what happens to Á˜. The decrease in formality
(i.e. an increase in µ˜) increases E [U ],4 but the decrease in the formal wage premium reduces
E [U ]. However, the second e ect dominates and the increase in the payroll tax reduces E [U ] ,
which means that Á˜ goes down and hence that participation in the modern sector goes down.5
This decrease in participation will create a shortage of e ective low-skilled labour and so the
cost of e ective, low-skilled labour w˜L will go up. This will shift the relative demand curve up
and o set these e ects somewhat, but these general equilibrium e ects are second order and so
cannot be strong enough to reverse the e ects on formality, the formal sector wage premium,
3The demand curve shifts down because from equation 4 ˆf
D
ˆ·p
= ≠ (1≠·c)—wI
2FL◊
#
1≠f
◊ +
f
1≠◊
$ < 0 and it becomes
flatter because ˆ
2fD
ˆ—ˆ·p
= ≠
1
◊ (1≠·c)
2F
#
1≠f
◊ +
f
1≠◊
$wI < 0.
4E[U ] can be rewritten as E [U ] = wF + bU + bF + “bL + J (µ˜) µ˜ + [1≠ J (µ˜)]E [µ|µ > µ˜] which means that
ˆE[U ]
ˆµ˜ = J (µ˜) > 0
5To see this, approximate the relative supply and demand curves around the equilibrium f and — by straight
lines. The relative demand curve will have a slope of ≠ 2F
#
1≠f
◊ +
f
1≠◊
$
1
◊ (1≠·c)(1+·p)wI
which we will denote „ and the relative
supply curve will have a slope of 1/j (µ˜)wI which we will denote ’. Under this linear approximation, if the shift
down in the demand curve is of size  , then the change in f , df is given by ≠ (’ ≠ „)  and the change in —, d— is
given by ≠’ (’ ≠ „) . Since f = 1≠J (µ˜), this means that the change in µ˜ is dµ˜ = ≠df/j (µ˜) = (’ ≠ „) /j (µ˜).
Similarly, the change in the formal wage (holding the informal wage constant) is dwF = wId— = ≠’wI (’ ≠ „) .
Finally, the total change in E [U ] is dE [U ] = dwF +J (µ˜) dµ˜ ¥
!
≠’wI + J(µ˜)j(µ˜)
"
(’ ≠ „)  = J(µ˜)≠1j(µ˜) (’ ≠ „)  < 0
demonstrating that the increase in the payroll tax reduces E [U ].
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and participation, only dampen them. Overall, the reduction in formality and the reduction in
participation will lead to a fall in productivity and output in the economy. This may seem to
form a compelling argument for the abolition of payroll taxes. However, this need not inevitably
be the case.
Workers may perceive there to be a direct link between the payroll taxes they pay and the
benefits they receive. Thus, they may perceive these taxes as contributions towards their even-
tual benefits (as in, for example, an individual retirement account). Under these circumstances,
payroll taxes may actually generate an incentive for workers to want to be formal because of
the insurance they will receive.
The analysis of the corporate income tax is the converse of that for the payroll tax. Because
wages paid to formal workers can be deducted from a firm’s corporate income tax base, a
corporate income tax makes formal workers more attractive relative to informal workers. So, an
increase in the corporate income tax rate will shift the relative demand curve up and make it
steeper as in figure 3.6 This will increase formality and raise the formal sector wage premium.
The increase in formality is a decrease in µ˜ which reduces E [U ] while the increase in the formal
sector wage premium — increases E [U ], but as was the case with the payroll tax, the wage
e ect dominates and so the overall e ect is to increase the expected utility of working in the
modern sector E [U ]. This increases Á˜ and so increases participation in the modern sector labour
force. Again, as was the case for the payroll tax, there will be o setting second-order general
equilibrium e ects, but they will not be strong enough to reverse the direction of these e ects.
This highlights the e ective role that a well designed corporate income tax (CIT) can play in
the tax system. Of course, we saw briefly in section 3.1, and as will be discussed below in section
4.3 in greater detail, the corporate income tax also generates incentives for firms to under-report
their sales, and does so in a way that interacts with other taxes (particularly the VAT). Thus,
one cannot just rely upon increasing the CIT exclusively to raise revenue.
Finally, in a simple, 1-sector framework, the VAT ·v does not a ect labour informality.
In a richer model with multiple sectors, this may no longer be the case, depending on how
complementary labour inputs are with intermediate inputs (this extension remains for further
work as discussed in section 5). Also, one of the most appealing features of the VAT is that it
preserves production e ciency (in the sense of Diamond & Mirrlees, 1971). In our framework
with evasion the VAT still preserves production e ciency, only the reporting of sales and so this
relative neutrality property of the VAT makes it an attractive instrument for raising revenues
on a broad base with minimal distortions. Thus, extreme care should be taken in implementing
departures from uniformity, as not only do these destroy production e ciency7, these also create
opportunities for evasion and rent seeking. However, as for the corporate income tax, a properly
6The demand curve shifts up because from equation 4 ˆf
D
ˆ·c
= (1+·p)—wI
2FL◊
#
1≠f
◊ +
f
1≠◊
$ > 0 and it becomes steeper
because ˆ
2fD
ˆ—ˆ·c
=
1
◊ (1+·p)
2F
#
1≠f
◊ +
f
1≠◊
$wI > 0.
7Indeed, Maurice Lalé, the father of the world’s first VAT in France in 1954 describes exemptions as “the
cancer of the VAT system” European Commission (2010, p.28)
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Figure 3: Increase in corporate income tax
designed VAT with minimal exemptions has the e ect to reduce under-reporting of sales by firms,
and should also raise CIT revenues without raising CIT rates.
4.2 Benefits
There are four benefits in our framework, the formal sector benefit bF , the TMIG bO, the
targeted benefit bL, and the universal benefit bU . In this section we explore the comparative
static e ects of increasing these by a small amount, starting with the formal benefit bF . Looking
at equation (5), we can see that an increase in bF will shift the supply curve down,8 causing
the formal sector wage premium — to fall and labour formality to rise as in figure 4. Since the
relative demand is not perfectly inelastic, the fall in the wage premium will not be su cient to
o set the increase in consumption coming from the increase in bF and so formal workers will be
better o , making it more attractive to be a formal worker and thus increasing labour formality.
Work in the modern sector has become more attractive overall, raising E [U ] and Á˜ and hence
increasing participation in the modern sector, labour productivity and output. This increase in
participation increases the supply of e ective labour and so has the general equilibrium e ect
of reducing the cost of e ective low-skilled labour w˜L which will shift the relative demand curve
down, but this second order e ect will not reverse the overall increase in labour formality. Since
the authorities have reliable information on formal workers’ wages, this analysis suggests that
formal sector benefits are an appealing instrument to use to channel benefits to low-skilled
households working in the formal sector. More accurate information availability will enhance
possibilities of targeted or categorical benefits and that these will also act to encourage labour
8It shifts the supply curve down because ˆf
S
ˆbF
= ˆf
S
ˆµ˜
ˆµ˜
ˆbF
= j (µ˜) > 0
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Figure 4: Increase in formal sector benefit
formality and participation. Workers entering the formal sector may welcome enhanced benefits
for retirement, disability or unemployment, as these have important insurance e ects. To the
extent that burdens on employers can be reduced–e.g., by defined contribution schemes, financed
by workers, and perhaps general revenues, the disincentive e ects on firms could be minimized.
An increase in the TMIG bO has all the same e ects as the formal benefit, but in the opposite
direction. On top of this, the TMIG has a direct, negative e ect on participation. As we can
see from equation (5), an increase in bO will shift the supply curve up,9 causing the formal
sector wage premium — to rise and labour formality to fall as in figure 4. This comes about
because even though the benefit bO is targeted at households with no work, enforcement is
imperfect and workers with informal jobs may still receive the benefit, making informal work
more attractive. Since relative demand is not perfectly inelastic, the rise in the wage premium
will not be su cient to o set the increase in the consumption of informal workers coming from
the increase in bO and so informal workers will be relatively better o , making it less attractive
to be a formal worker and thus decreasing labour formality.
Work in the modern sector has become less attractive overall, decreasing E [U ]. Furthermore,
the TMIG bO has a direct e ect on Á˜ and so participation in the modern sector falls sharply,
decreasing labour productivity and output. This decrease in participation reduces the supply
of e ective labour and so has the general equilibrium e ect of increasing the cost of e ective
low-skilled labour w˜L which will shift the relative demand curve up, but this second order e ect
will not reverse the overall decrease in labour formality and especially participation.
This suggests that using targeted minimum income guarantees targeted to those outside the
9It shifts the supply curve down because ˆf
S
ˆbO
= ˆf
S
ˆµ˜
ˆµ˜
ˆbO
= ≠j (µ˜) < 0
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Figure 5: Increase in targeted minimum income guarantee
modern sector can be a very costly way to redistribute to this group if the level of the benefit
is too high. Since, by definition, informal workers are di cult to monitor, it will be extremely
di cult, if not impossible to stop informal workers from claiming the benefit. However, formal
workers are registered and so it is relatively simple to prevent them from receiving a benefit
they are not eligible for. This means that a high level of bO will make it more attractive to
be an informal worker, raise informality, and mean that formal employers have to raise formal
wages in order to attract workers, e ectively taxing formal employment, reducing productivity
and e ciency.
The universal benefit bU has the appealing feature that it does not distort incentives. Since
all citizens are eligible independent of whether they are formal workers or informal workers
or whether they work in the modern sector or not, the level of the universal benefit does not
a ect decisions to be in any of these occupations. However, this feature also makes it extremely
expensive, as it must be provided for the entire population. This means that providing universal
benefits may place severe demands on the government budget if they are to be provided at levels
that achieve the government’s social goals. Financing this may then require resorting to very
high levels of taxation and the facing the resultant very strong loss of economic e ciency,
productivity and growth.
Finally, we have the targeted or basic benefit bL. A basic benefit could be useful in com-
pensating the losers of reform, especially as a shift from the payroll tax towards a VAT would
change relative prices and have an impact on middle and lower income groups. In the Mexican
setting, this might be compensated by additions to categorical targeted transfers, e.g., for the
aged (the 70+ pension); or for children in school or women attending selected clinics.
Some reform proposals have suggested raising the level of the Progresa/Oportunidades ben-
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efit. However, a significant portion of the informal workers are likely to be single migrants
without children, the Oportunidades program may have only partial coverage. In addition, the
georgraphic targeting is likely to limit labour mobility. Further, high levels of Oportunidades
benefits create distortions that provide disincentives to improving living conditions (e.g., getting
concrete flooring). Thus, while Oportunidades may be an e ective program for the long-term
poor in rural areas, it may not be adequate as an instrument to compensate for the e ects of
relative price changes that may a ect largely middle to lower income groups in urban areas, and
without access to home grown produce that may be relatively immune to the price changes. It
may, thus, need to be supplemented by other measures. This may also be true of Oportunidades
“clones”, such as the highly targeted conditional cash transfer, Benazir Income Support Pro-
gram in Pakistan, which targets the poorest in rural areas based on an asset holding test. This
class of measures are inadequate in providing compensation for those a ected by the relative
price changes.
Overall, an appropriate benefit system has to be designed with country characteristics in
mind. Very specifically targeted measures may be inadequate in protecting the urban lower
middle and poorer classes from the price shocks. The specific context in each country may yield
di erent combinations of social policies or benefit systems.
In our framework, the basic benefit bL does not a ect incentives, since the characteristic on
which eligibility depends (low ability) is assumed to be exogenous to any decisions by households.
Of course, if households make human capital investments in order to become high ability workers,
then the incentives to make this investment will be a ected if the returns to the investment are
reduced through the erosion of benefits. In general, the incentive e ects of targeting mechanisms
are an issue to be considered carefully in the design of the implementation of targeted transfers,
an issue we turn to next.
4.3 Implementation
The government has two implementation parameters, “, the e ectiveness of the targeting tech-
nology with which to deliver the targeted or basic benefit bL, and ÷ the parameter controlling the
probability of detection of sales under-reporting. These parameters are only partly exogenous
and careful design can help to improve them.
The targeting parameter “ will depend on the choice of criteria used to determine eligibility
for the benefit. As shown by Akerlof, 1978, good eligibility criteria have the properties of being
correlated with ability, being exogenous to decisions made by households and being immutable
in response to the benefit. To this we would add two issues. First in the context of many
developing countries, complex eligibility criteria open up the possibility that they will be used
for rent seeking purposes by o cials who can manipulate eligibility scores in order to extract
rents from potential recipients. Second, in a multilevel government, the issue of the appropriate
level of government to finance and implement such a benefit comes to the fore. For example,
in the context of India’s guaranteed work programme NREGA, Niehaus & Sukhtankar (2011)
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show that local government (Panchayat) o cials exploit changes in state level laws and federal
funding to extract rents from program participants.
We touched upon the enforcement parameter ÷ in section 3.1 but this issue bears fleshing
out. Improvements in ÷ improve the reporting of sales. This broadens the tax base of and
increases revenues from both the VAT and the corporate income tax, thus raising more revenue
at a lower e ciency cost. The crucial issue here is the information generated by the tax system
which has two aspects. First, the tax administration authorities should optimally capture and
use the information generated by the filing of tax returns. This means e ective information
management systems and the sharing of information across tax bases that is relevant to both.
An example of best practice in this is the recent merger of the corporate income tax and VAT
departments at Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in the United Kingdom partly in order to
be able to pool information generated by each of these taxes.
The second critical component is the design of tax policy that minimises the opportunities
for evasion. Exemptions from the VAT, for example, break production chains and hurt the
enforcement of the VAT. However, this also has the knock-on e ect of making it easier for these
firms to evade their corporate income tax liabilities. In general, complicated rate structures with
numerous zero-ratings and exemptions open up loopholes that firms can use to evade and avoid
their tax liabilities across taxes and are therefore to be avoided. Rather than using exemptions
and zero-ratings of necessities for redistributional purposes, a well targeted benefit to o set price
increases on these goods, if available, is a far more e cient means of achieving redistributional
aims.
5 Extensions
In order to explore how the e ects we have analysed here travel along production chains, the
first extension to the framework we propose would be to extend the model to include multiple
sectors and intermediate inputs. For example, one of the greatest merits of a uniform VAT is
that it generates powerful incentives along production chains to report transactions truthfully
through the credit invoicing method of implementation. One firm may wish to evade the VAT
by under-reporting its sales, but if these sales are to another firm, this would increase the VAT
liability of the downstream firm and so if they were to evade the VAT they would have to collude.
The longer are production chains, the less likely that this sophisticated level of collusion would
be sustainable and so the VAT with invoice crediting is virtually self-enforcing. How this story
changes when one or more sectors along the production chain are excluded from the VAT could
be explored in a multi-sector version of our model.
A second extension we would like to explore would be to embed this framework into a mul-
tilevel government. In practice, certain tax bases are assigned to di erent levels of government
and the revenues from di erent taxes are shared in di erent ways amongst the various levels of
government. Thus, the extent that di erent regions di er, any reform to any of the taxes or
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benefits would create gainers and losers and this would be a first order concern in the passage
of any proposed legislation. For instance, the Mexican case becomes quite complicated, given
the overall pressures on general revenues with declining oil production, and specifically signif-
icant are constraints at the state level. This is because the nomina (payroll tax) is assigned
to the states and is one of the few major own-source revenues. Complicated revenue-sharing
arrangements imply that there will be gainers and losers among the states/provinces, and again
compensation mechanisms through minimum intergovernmental transfers, or hold harmless con-
ditions, may be needed. A multi-government version of our framework would permit us to study
these issues more carefully. Of course, the intergovernmental dimensions are more important in
some countries (such as in India and Pakistan, Indonesia, as well as in Argentina and Brazil)
rather than others (such as small unitary states, e.g., in the GCC), and again, a case by case
assessment is likely to be needed.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
We have presented a framework for the analysis of tax and benefit policy in contexts where
informality is prevalent. We consider a wide range of taxes and benefits and highlight how
they a ect incentives for firms and workers to be informal and how benefit policy interacts with
tax policy. Our framework allows us to consider various tax instruments jointly, in contrast to
much existing work, and also consider benefit policy jointly with tax policy. We are thus able
to highlight the important interactions between taxes and between taxes and benefits. We find
that payroll taxes and targeted minimum income guarantees targeted at households operating
outside the modern sector are particularly damaging to incentives for formality, productivity
and economic e ciency. Furthermore, we find that corporate income taxes as well as the VAT
have an important role to play in raising revenues in an e cient manner. We also suggest
that, in addition to the traditional consideration of the e ciency cost of taxation, the impact
on incentives to evade and for informality should be central considerations in the design of tax
policy in developing countries.
Any tax reform has the potential to generate gainers and losers. The success of chosen options
will not be assured unless compensation measures are designed to address the losses, especially
of the relatively poorer groups. However, care should be taken to idetify the groups a ected
by the reforms, and not to blindly increase the value of highly targeted conditional transfers
that may not even reach those a ected by the reforms. Also, in designing targeted benfits, the
overall resource constraint has to be kept in mind, so that the gains are not completely o set
by the compensatory measures.
21
A Technical Appendix on Existence of Equilibrium
The firm’s first order conditions for profit maximisation are
p˜–L◊L
–L≠1
E H
–H ≠ (1≠ ·c) (1 + ·p)wF + FL
3
LI
L
42
Æ 0 (7)
p˜–L (1≠ ◊)L–L≠1E H–H ≠ wI ≠ FLLI
3
L+ LF
L2
4
Æ 0 (8)
p˜–HL
–L
E H
–H≠1 ≠ (1≠ ·c) (1 + ·p)wH Æ 0 (9)
p
I
2÷FY
A
1≠ Yˆ
Y
B
≠ [1≠ (1≠ ·c) (1≠ ·v)]
J
Æ 0 (10)
where
p˜ = ˆ 
ˆY
= p
SU1≠ ÷FY
Qa1≠A Yˆ
Y
B2RbTV (11)
is the firm’s marginal benefit of output. Equilibrium will require that all the markets clear.
That is, that the market for high-skilled labour clears:
HD = HS
The market for (e ective) low-skilled labour clears
LDE = LSE
The submarkets for formal and informal low-skilled labour clear
LSF = LDF & LSI = LDI
and finally that the market for final output clears:
púY ú = [wH + bF + bU + (1≠ “) bL] +NI (wI + bU + bO + “bL) +NF (wF + bU + bF + “bL)
+NO (bO + E [Á|Á < Á˜]) + ú
By Walras’ law we will only need to focus on 3 of these so we will focus on the first three. The
first order conditions (7) - (9) imply that
w˜L
–L
LE =
w˜H
–H
H
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where w˜H = (1≠ ·c) (1 + ·p)wH is the producer cost of labour, so that taking (9) we get that
p˜–H
3
–L:
w˜L
w˜H
–H
4–L
H–H+–L≠1 = w˜H
≈∆ HD =
A
p˜
3
–H
w˜H
41≠–L 3–L
w˜L
4–LB 11≠–L≠–H
and hence that
LDE =
A
p˜
3
–H
w˜H
4–H 3–L
w˜L
41≠–HB 11≠–L≠–H
which means that output is
Y =
3
p˜–L+–H
3
–H
w˜H
4–H 3–L
w˜L
4–L4 11≠–L≠–H
Labour market Equilibrium
There is a supply of 1 unit of high-skilled labour, so HS = 1 meaning that the equilibrium
condition for high skilled labour will require that
HS = HD
1 =
A
p˜
3
–H
w˜H
41≠–L 3–L
w˜L
4–LB 11≠–L≠–H
where HD is clearly decreasing in the wage w˜H and supply is constant so there will be a wage
that clears the market.
For the low skilled, things are somewhat di erent as the supply of e ective low-skilled labour
depends on the number of formal and informal low-skilled workers.
LSE = ◊LSF + (1≠ ◊)LSI
= NK (Á˜) {◊ [1≠ J (µ˜)] + (1≠ ◊)J (µ˜)}
so that equilibrium for e ective low-skilled labour will require that
LSE = LDE
NK (Á˜) {◊ [1≠ J (µ˜)] + (1≠ ◊) J (µ˜)} =
A
p˜
3
–H
w˜H
4–H 3–L
w˜L
41≠–HB 11≠–L≠–H
The right hand side here is decreasing in w˜L so that demand is downward sloping. Showing
that the left hand side is upward sloping is a bit more involved. The relationship between
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wF and wI , given by — is pinned down by the equilibrium in the submarkets for formal and
informal labour (the subject of section 3.2). An increase in w˜L shifts the relative demand curve
upwards so that both — and f are increasing in w˜L. Since LSE = NK (Á˜) [◊f + (1≠ ◊) (1≠ f)] is
increasing in f and by equation (4) w˜L is increasing in wI , this also means that LSE is increasing
in wI . Since supply is increasing in w˜L and demand is decreasing in w˜L there will exist an
informal wage wI which generates a w˜L that clears the market for e ective low-skilled labour.
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